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The Urgency of Reforming Entitlement Programs: The Case of Social
Security Disability Insurance
Summary
Enrollment in the Social Security Disability Insurance program has risen significantly since the late 1980s;
consequently, program expenditures have far outpaced revenues and the SSDI trust fund is projected to hit
zero in 2016. Moreover, the SSDI program, as currently administered, discourages applicants and recipients of
benefits from seeking and returning to work, thereby reducing federal tax revenues at a time when deficit
reduction is critical. The SSDI program can and must be reformed. Reconsidering the medical eligibility
criteria for benefits, promoting earlier medical interventions, allowing for SSA representation at appeal
hearings on benefit decisions, enacting time limits for some benefit awards, and increasing the frequency of
continuing disability reviews can help make the program more efficient, encourage individuals to return to
work, and enhance economic growth.
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The Social Security Disability Insurance 
(SSDI) program represents an extremely 
important part of our nation’s safety net, 
as it protects workers and their families 
from the risk of a disability that prevents or 
greatly inhibits a person’s ability to work. It 
currently provides insurance to more than 
150 million American adults. 1 
The future sustainability of this pro-
gram, however, is at risk. Nearly 9 mil-
lion adults received SSDI disabled worker 
benefits in July 2013. This number represents 
a significant increase in SSDI enrollment 
over the past 25 years. As shown in Figure 
1, enrollment in the SSDI program has 
grown steadily since the late 1980s, from 2.3 
percent of adults aged 25-64 in 1989 to 5.0 
percent by 2012.2 As the number of people 
receiving SSDI benefits has swelled, so too 
have total program expenditures, which 
exceeded $140 billion in the 2012 calendar 
year. Since SSDI recipients also receive 
health insurance through the Medicare 
program (after two years from onset of 
disability), total Medicare expenditures for 
SSDI recipients topped $80 billion in 2011. 
All told, SSDI expenditures currently exceed 
program revenues by almost 30 percent, and 
as a result, the program’s trust fund is rapidly 
being depleted, having fallen from $216 
billion at the end of 2008 to $107 billion 
in July 2013. Current projections from the 
OASDI Trustees (under the intermediate 
scenario) suggest that the SSDI trust fund 
will hit zero in 2016.
Furthermore, this increase in SSDI 
enrollment has coincided with a reduction 
in employment rates among individuals 
with disabilities.3  Academic studies have 
shown that the SSDI program, as currently 
administered, not only reduces the incentive 
to work, but also creates obstacles to re-
entering the workforce.  By inhibiting labor 
force participation, SSDI in turn reduces tax 
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revenues—which is particularly troubling 
today, when revenue generation and deficit 
reduction are sorely needed.
In this issue brief, I summarize the 
factors that are responsible for the growth 
in SSDI enrollment and then outline the 
implications of this growth for the U.S. 
labor market. I conclude by discussing the 
potential for changes to SSDI that could 
increase employment and improve economic 
well-being among individuals with disabili-
ties while also reducing the fiscal burden of 
the program.
      
Why has ssDi enrollmenT 
increaseD?
Some of the growth in SSDI enrollment 
reflects demographic changes—in particu-
lar, the aging of the baby boom generation. 
Individuals in their fifties and early sixties 
are significantly more likely to receive SSDI 
benefits than their counterparts in their 
thirties and forties. 
However, as Table 1 demonstrates, the 
percentage of adults receiving SSDI has also 
risen sharply within age groups.  
Consider individuals between the ages 
of 50 and 59. In 1989, 1 out of 23 adults in 
this age group was receiving SSDI benefits. 
But by 2012, this had almost doubled to 1 
in 12. The increase was similarly dramatic 
for adults in their forties and also substantial 
for adults in their early sixties and those 
between 25 and 39. The aging of the popula-
tion therefore explains just 18 percent of 
the increase in SSDI enrollment from 2.3 
percent to 5.0 percent during the 1989 to 
2012 time period.4
To be insured for SSDI benefits, a per-
son must have worked in at least five of the 
ten most recent years.  Because employment 
rates have increased among women since 
the 1980s, the fraction of women insured 
under the program has risen as well, from 
66 percent to 76 percent between 1989 and 
2012. This has also contributed to enroll-
ment growth in the SSDI program and 
partially explains why SSDI has grown more 
rapidly among women than men during this 
time period. But this factor explains just 
12 percent of the rise in SSDI enrollment. 
Taken together, the aging of the baby boom 
population and changes in the fraction of 
adults insured for SSDI can explain less 
than one-third of the growth in the program 
from 1989 to 2012, depicted in Figure 1.
A much more important determinant 
of the growth in SSDI enrollment since the 
1980s is the liberalization of the program’s 
medical eligibility criteria that occurred 
in the mid-1980s.5 As shown in Figure 2, 
there has been a dramatic increase in award 
rates for mental disorders and diseases 
of the musculoskeletal system (e.g., back 
pain). In contrast, award rates for neoplasms 
(cancer) and circulatory conditions (e.g., 
heart attack, stroke) have remained roughly 
constant. This shift is important because, 
as shown in recent research, the employ-
ment potential of SSDI applicants with 
these more subjective conditions remains 
substantial, and it is often difficult to verify 
the severity of these conditions (in contrast 
to cancer or heart conditions).6 With the 
liberalization of the medical eligibility cri-
teria, it has become increasingly possible for 
people who are capable of working to qualify 
instead for SSDI benefits.
The reduction in the generosity of 
OASI retired worker benefits also has 
   1 This brief draws heavily from recent testimony by Mark 
Duggan before the hearing on “Encouraging Work 
Through the Social Security Disability Insurance Pro-
gram,” held by the House Committee on Ways and 
Means Subcommittee on Social Security, on June 19, 
2013.
 2 It should be noted that SSDI is not the only federal 
disability program that has been growing rapidly and 
becoming increasingly costly. The fraction of veterans 
receiving VA disability, for instance, has almost doubled 
(from 8.8 to 15.8 percent) since 1999, after remaining 
stable since the early 1970s.
   3 David H. Autor and Mark Duggan, “Supporting Work: 
A Proposal for Modernizing the US Disability Insurance 
System,” Center for American Progress and the Hamilton 
Project (2010).
   4 Put another way, if age-specific rates of SSDI enrollment 
had remained unchanged from 1989 to 2012, the per-
centage of adults 25-64 on SSDI would have increased 
from 2.3 percent to 2.7 percent.
   5 Mark Duggan and Scott A. Imberman, “Why Are the Dis-
ability Rolls Skyrocketing? The Contribution of Population 
Characteristics, Economic Conditions, and Program 
Generosity.” In Health at Older Ages: The Causes and 
Consequences of Declining Disability among the Elderly 
(University of Chicago Press, 2009), pp. 337-379.
  6 Till Von Wachter, Jae Song, and Joyce Manchester, 
“Trends in Employment and Earnings of Allowed and 














1957 1962 1967 1972 1977 1982 1987 1992 1997 2002 2007 2012
Table 1:  
 age groUP % of aDUlTs on ssDi % of men on ssDi % of Women on ssDi
  1989 2011 1989 2011 1989 2011
 25-39 0.8% 1.4% 1.1% 1.5% 0.5% 1.4%
 40-49 1.9% 3.7% 2.5% 3.8% 1.2% 3.6%
 50-59 4.3% 8.2% 5.8% 8.7% 2.9% 7.6%
 60-64 7.8% 13.0% 11.0% 14.5% 5.0% 11.5%
 25-64 2.3% 5.0% 3.0% 5.2% 1.5% 4.7%
  
had a spillover effect in propelling SSDI 
enrollment. Individuals born in 1937 or 
earlier could receive 80 percent of their full 
retirement benefit if they claimed retired 
worker benefits at the age of 62. As a result 
of federal legislation passed in 1983, this has 
gradually fallen to 75 percent for individuals 
born from 1943 to 1954 and will soon fall 
to 70 percent for individuals born in 1960 
or later (with an associated increase in the 
full retirement age from 65 to 67 as well). 
No corresponding changes were made to 
SSDI benefits and thus SSDI has become 
relatively more attractive financially.  More 
specifically, SSDI benefits were 25 percent 
more generous than retirement benefits 
at age 62 for those born in 1937 or earlier 
but will be 43 percent more generous for 
those born in 1960 or later. Recent research 
demonstrates that the declining generos-
ity of retired worker benefits has induced 
a substantial number of adults to apply for 
and ultimately receive SSDI, and that this 
explains a substantial fraction of the growth 
in SSDI enrollment since the late 1980s.7
The financial motivation for seeking 
SSDI benefits is all the greater because 
replacement rates (potential benefits divided 
by potential earnings) for the typical low-
skilled worker have risen on account of 
two interrelated factors.8 First, SSDI (like 
OASI) uses a progressive 90-32-15 benefit 
formula with “bend points” that increase 
each year with average earnings growth. 
Second, earnings for low-income workers 
have grown more slowly than the average, 
and as a result workers replace an increas-
ing fraction of their earnings at a 90 percent 
rate rather than 32 percent rate. This has 
increased the financial incentive to apply 
for SSDI benefits and, once enrolled in the 
program, to stay enrolled.
The sensitivity of the SSDI program 
to economic conditions has been another 
important driver of enrollment growth. 
As shown in Figure 3, applications to the 
SSDI program are highly responsive to the 
unemployment rate, with applications rising 
substantially during economic downturns 
and falling when the economy improves. 
Previous research has shown that the SSDI 
program has become much more sensitive to 
economic conditions since the early 1980s 
(partly due to the program’s less stringent 
medical eligibility criteria) and that indi-
viduals who lose their job or who are unable 
to find a new job are increasingly likely to 
exit the labor force and apply for SSDI ben-
efits.9 Thus the program is to some extent 
serving as a form of long-term unemploy-
ment insurance for some workers, which is 
troubling when one considers the very low 
rate at which SSDI recipients return to the 
labor force.
Still other factors have contributed to 
the steady rise in SSDI enrollment since 
the late 1980s. Individuals who are initially 
rejected when they apply for SSDI have 
become more likely to appeal those decisions 
and are increasingly likely to be represented 
by a lawyer or other professional if/when 
they ultimately appear before an Adminis-
trative Law Judge (ALJ).10 The fraction of 
recipients receiving a continuing disability 
review (CDR) and exiting the program for 
no longer meeting SSDI’s medical eligibility 
Rejected Applicants to the Social Security Disability 
Insurance Program,” American Economic Review 101, 
no. 7 (2011): 3308.
  7 Mark Duggan, Perry Singleton, and Jae Song, “Aching to 
Retire? The Rise in the Full Retirement Age and Its Impact 
on the Social Security Disability Rolls,” Journal of Public 
Economics 91, no. 7 (2007): 1327-1350.
  8 David H. Autor and Mark Duggan, “The Rise in the 
Disability Rolls and the Decline in Unemployment,” The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 118, no. 1 (2003): 157-
206.
   9 Autor and Duggan, 2003.
 10 In the average year from 2000 to 2008, administrative 
law judges made awards in 72 percent of their decisions. 
This is striking when one considers that ALJs consider 
appeals only among those rejected twice previously by 
SSA. One potential contributor to the high award rate is 
that SSA is not represented at the hearing – only the ap-
plicant and/or his/her representative are typically present 
with the ALJ. See Social Security Administration, Annual 
Statistical Report on the Social Security Disability Insur-
ance Program, 2011, available at http://ssa.gov/policy/
docs/statcomps/di_asr/2011/di_asr11.pdf (2012); David 
H. Autor and Mark Duggan, “The Growth in the Social 
Security Disability Insurance Rolls: A Fiscal Crisis Unfold-
ing,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 20, no 2 (2006): 
71-96.
 11 Duggan and Imberman, 2009.
figUre 2:  aWarDs Per 1000 insUreD for ssDi by Diagnosis caTegory  
in 1983, 1989, 1999, 2009
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criteria has also declined due to a decline in 
authorized spending for CDRs. 
For all of these reasons, enrollment in 
the SSDI program has grown steadily and 
rapidly while average health has if anything 
improved among non-elderly adults during 
this period.11
      
labor markeT effecTs 
of The rise in ssDi 
enrollmenT
While providing valuable insurance to 
tens of millions of Americans, the SSDI 
program reduces the incentive to work both 
for individuals on the program and also for 
those applying for SSDI benefits. In order 
to receive an SSDI award, a beneficiary must 
be deemed unable to engage in substantial 
gainful activity (SGA, currently $1,040 per 
month). Once on the program, an SSDI 
recipient has little incentive to return to 
work, as earnings above the SGA threshold 
lead to a termination of benefits. And given 
that the present value of the average SSDI 
award is $270,000 (including Medicare ben-
efits), that is an outcome that many SSDI 
recipients would be reluctant to seek.
The growth in SSDI enrollment has 
coincided with a substantial reduction in 
employment rates among individuals with 
disabilities. For example, from 1988 to 2008, 
the employment rate of men in their forties 
and fifties who reported a work-limiting 
disability fell from 28 percent to 16 percent 
while the corresponding rate for men with-
out a disability rose slightly from 87 to 88 
percent.12 As shown in Figure 4, the gap in 
employment rates grew similarly rapidly for 
women with and without disabilities in this 
same age range.
Previous research has shown that 
workers have become increasingly likely to 
respond to adverse labor demand shocks by 
applying for SSDI rather than seeking a new 
job.13 This serves to reduce both the unem-
ployment rate and the labor force participa-
tion rate below what it otherwise would be. 
It also reduces the eventual employment rate 
as SSDI recipients rarely leave the program 
to return to the workforce. For example 
in 2010, only 0.7 percent (7 out of 1,000) 
of SSDI recipients left the program for 
improving health and/or to return to work.
This responsiveness of the SSDI 
program to economic conditions can be 
seen visually in Figure 2, with increases in 
the unemployment rate leading to large 
increases in the SSDI application rate. My 
analysis of this application data reveals that 
there have been approximately 2.5 million 
“extra” SSDI applications since 2008 as a 
result of the economic downturn. Many of 
these applicants have withdrawn from the 
labor force, either because they have been 
awarded SSDI benefits or are still in the 
process of applying for benefits given the 
long lags in the process (especially at the 
appeal stage). Still others have likely with-
drawn because their attachment to the labor 
force has declined during the application 
process (even if ultimately denied) and thus 
their potential wages as well.
The steady increase in SSDI enrollment 
since the late 1980s has contributed to a 
differential decline in labor force participa-
tion among both men and women in the 
U.S. relative to other industrialized coun-
tries. For example, the labor force participa-
tion rate declined by 4.7 percentage points 
(from 93.4% to 88.7%) among men 25-54 
in the U.S. during the 1990 to 2011 period 
while falling just 1.5 percentage points 
(from 93.6% to 92.1%) among the EU-15.14 
Similarly, while the labor force participation 
rate was almost unchanged among women 
25-54 in the U.S. from 1990 to 2011 (rising 
slightly from 74.0% to 74.7%), it increased 
by 14.8 percentage points (from 63.7% to 
78.5%) among women in the EU-15 during 
this same period. Thus labor force partici-
pation rates for both men and women in 
the 25-54 age range were in 2011 substan-
tially higher in the EU-15 than in the U.S. 
While there are of course many factors that 
influence both the level and the trend in 
labor force participation, previous research 
indicates that the SSDI program is an 
important factor.
      
imProVing Work 
incenTiVes in The ssDi 
Program
The disability determination process that is 
currently used by the SSDI program awards 
benefits to individuals who are deemed 
unable to engage in substantial gainful 
activity. This reduces the incentive to work 
among those who have filed an initial appli-
 12 Autor and Duggan, 2010.
 13 Autor and Duggan, 2003.
 14 These differences are even larger when focusing on 
men between the ages of 25 and 64 and are somewhat 
smaller when restricting attention to the 1990 to 2008 
period. Declines in labor force participation among men 
aged 25-54 were also much lower in Australia, Canada, 
and Japan than in the U.S. during this same period 
(OECD, 2013).
 15 Social Security Administration, Office of the Inspector 
General, “Audit Report: Disability Claims Overall Process-
ing Times,” 2008.
 16 David H. Autor, Nicole Maestas, Kathleen Mullen, and 
Alexander Strand, “Does Delay Cause Decay? The Ef-
fect of Administrative Decision Time on the Labor Force 
Participation and Earnings of Disability Applicants,” MIT 
Working Paper, 2011
 17 Autor and Duggan, 2010.
 18 For evidence in Norway, see Andreas Kostøl and Magne 
Mogstad, “How Financial Incentives Induce Disability 
Insurance Recipients to Return to Work,” forthcoming in 
the American Economic Review (2013).
 19 Social Security Administration, http://ssa.gov/policy/
docs/statcomps/di_asr/2011/di_asr11.pdf (2012).
%
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cation for SSDI and among those appeal-
ing a rejection. According to data from the 
Social Security Administration, approxi-
mately 40 percent of SSDI awards are now 
made on appeal and the time between the 
initial application and the ultimate decision 
is very long for this group. For example, the 
average lag for an applicant who appeals 
to an Administrative Law Judge is 27 
months.15  This is problematic because those 
initially rejected are likely to be in bet-
ter health on average than those receiving 
an initial award and thus to have higher 
employment potential. And the longer that 
a person remains out of the workforce, the 
more their earnings potential declines. Thus 
even if an applicant never receives an SSDI 
award, the program’s application process 
can permanently harm his/her employment 
prospects.16
One way to improve incentives in 
the SSDI program is to provide medical 
intervention sooner for individuals with 
work-limiting conditions, so that they can 
continue working. Many individuals with 
more subjective disorders—such as back 
pain—could benefit from such early inter-
vention. In a recent paper, David Autor and 
I proposed adding a “front end” to the SSDI 
system that would include early interven-
tion through rehabilitation and related 
services with the goal of keeping workers 
with work-limiting disabilities in the labor 
market.17 Employers would contract with 
private insurers to administer this coverage 
and would have a financial incentive to keep 
their workers off the SSDI system (much as 
the Unemployment Insurance and Workers’ 
Compensation programs provide employers 
with these types of financial incentives).
The payoff to keeping a potential SSDI 
applicant in the workforce is very high. As 
noted above, the average present value of an 
SSDI award (including Medicare expendi-
tures) is approximately $270,000. Addition-
ally, to the extent that the program reduces 
employment, it reduces tax revenue and 
GDP. While many who are awarded SSDI 
benefits are completely unable to work, 
recent research makes clear that a substantial 
number of them could work.
Increasing employment among indi-
viduals with disabilities could improve their 
economic well-being and increase their 
autonomy while also reducing the fiscal 
strains on Social Security. Past efforts to 
achieve this goal have unfortunately had 
little impact. For example, the Ticket to 
Work and Self-Sufficiency program, which 
was authorized by Congress in 1999, gives 
employment networks and vocational 
rehabilitation agencies a financial incen-
tive to help SSDI recipients return to work. 
Despite issuing more than 12.3 million 
tickets over a ten-year period, the pro-
gram helped less than 17 thousand SSDI 
recipients (0.1 percent of all tickets issued) 
return to work. Part of the reason for the 
low takeup was that the incentives often 
arrived too late – after SSDI recipients had 
been out of work for many years. Recent 
efforts to more directly increase work incen-
tives among disability insurance recipients 
by eliminating the “cash cliff ” have had 
some success in other countries and similar 
reforms in the U.S. could increase employ-
ment and economic well-being among cur-
rent SSDI recipients.18
There are other potential reforms that 
could improve the functioning of the SSDI 
program. For example, currently only the 
applicant and his/her representative are 
present at appeal hearings before ALJs. 
Thus SSA does not have someone present 
to explain why they rejected the application 
twice, and this may partially explain why 72 
percent of those initial decisions that appeal 
a second time are overturned by ALJs.19 
Additionally, there has been a substantial 
decline in recent years in the share of SSDI 
recipients receiving a continuing disability 
review (CDR), with this partially explaining 
the lower exit rate from the program. Care-
ful consideration of the appropriateness of 
the program’s medical eligibility criteria also 
seems warranted given the major shift in the 
conditions with which individuals qualify for 
SSDI benefits, as shown in Figure 2. And to 
the extent that economic (rather than only 
health) factors are considered by a disability 
examiner or ALJ when making an SSDI 
award, one could consider a time limit or a 
mandatory CDR for some awardees.
The lack of progress in improving work 
incentives in the SSDI program stands in 
marked contrast to the Temporary Assis-
tance to Needy Families (TANF) program. 
Reforms introduced in the 1990s (along 
with changes to the Earned Income Tax 
Credit) led to substantial gains in employ-
ment among past, current, and potential 
future TANF recipients and to a steady drop 
in program enrollment and expenditures.  
Similar progress is possible within the SSDI 
program if policymakers make reform of this 
program a priority.  The need for such prog-
ress is indeed urgent, both because of the 
pending expiration of the SSDI program’s 
trust fund and the trends in the U.S. labor 
market described above. 
The negotiations that will occur dur-
ing the next several weeks regarding the 
debt ceiling and the possible government 
shutdown provide an excellent opportunity 
for policymakers—in a bipartisan fash-
ion—to finally make meaningful changes 
to this large and rapidly growing program 
that has essentially been on auto-pilot for 
almost three decades. SSDI should remain 
a central part of the nation’s safety net, but 
with its current design, the program is sim-
ply not serving individuals with disabilities 
“SSDI should remain a central 
part of the nation’s safety net, 
but with its current design, the 
program is simply not serving 
individuals with disabilities or 
taxpayers well.”
or taxpayers well. Reforms to the program 
that increase the incentive both for SSDI 
recipients to return to work and for potential 
SSDI applicants to remain employed would 
strengthen the program’s long-term financial 
outlook while enhancing economic growth.
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Insurance program has risen significantly 
since the late 1980s; consequently, program 
expenditures have far outpaced revenues and 
the SSDI trust fund is projected to hit zero in 
2016.
•	 Moreover,	the	SSDI	program,	as	currently	
administered, discourages applicants and 
recipients of benefits from seeking and 
returning to work, thereby reducing federal 
tax revenues at a time when deficit reduction 
is critical.
•	 The	SSDI	program	can	and	must	be	
reformed.  Reconsidering the medical eligibil-
ity criteria for benefits, promoting earlier medi-
cal interventions, allowing for SSA representa-
tion at appeal hearings on benefit decisions, 
enacting time limits for some benefit awards, 
and increasing the frequency of continuing 
disability reviews can help make the program 
more efficient, encourage individuals to return 
to work, and enhance economic growth.
